One of the revelations of Eastern Europe has been the resilience of local and ethnic identity after the breakup of communism. Not for the first time, the language o f 'class' has come off second best. Colin M ercer argues that the politics of identity is undergoing a resurgence worldwide.
This contemporary interest is related to the need rethink political constituencies, alignments, forms of anisation, affiliation and processes. It concerns thinkinj Deyond class' and beyond the political and theoretics references of both a received marxism and a traditional abourism. The politics of identity is markedly a product of the 'seventies, of the New Left and of the new political logics sketched out by feminism, and the gay and black liberation movements which extended the meanings of politics and democracy to include issues of identity and culture. The slogan and principle 'the personal is political' provided the logic for this politics of identity. But this principle brings with it some pretty substantial problems.
interest is related to the need to orgar 'be E What started out as a useful agitational slogan and political emphasis was fused into a way of resolving, through an act of will, conflicts between the public and private spheres. This, according to Sheila Rowbotham, had nega tive consequences:
Because the political was fused with the personal, and because there were no external structures and form ally elected leaders, there were no mechanisms for distancing feelings of hurt, betrayal and anger, and the movement fractured.
Nonetheless, the emphases and new ways of thinking produced by the proposition that the personal is political served to return to tne agenda something that had been either forgotten or displaced: that the 'borders' between politics and personal identity formed by family life, eth nicity, lifestyle orientations and a range of other factors relating to our 'subjectivity' or sense of self are so porous as not to be borders at all. Child care is an example of this tangle of lines and one where it would clearly be un-31 r productive to say categorically that this set of respon-...... ........................public domain and this set in the a e sibilities lies in the pub rivate. As with housework, or domestic and community ealth and hygiene, the demarcations will remain a matter of political calculation rather than being enshrined forever in a balance sheet of public and private responsibilities. So, the personal is political but there is little to be gained from repeating this as a mantra until due attention has been paid to the detail of the democratic mechanisms which are necessary to realise and exploit its implications. This is the 'governmental' side to the relationship be tween the personal and the political which establishes a relationship between private individuals and the public state. There is another dimension of this relationship which results from the fact that we live not just in any old state but in a particular nation state. This aspect of the relation ship between the personal and the political which we might call 'cultural has recently been dramatically high lighted in an international reminder of the persistence and importance of the politics of identity.
Ethnic Armenians in Azerbaijan, Poles in Lithuania and the Ukraine, Hungarians in Romania, Germans in Poland, Albanians and Slovenians in Yugoslavia in the wake of the Gorbachev reforms attest, in a worst-case scenario to a resurgence of m itteleuropean, Baltic and Balkan nationalisms of an ugly hue. More dispassionately, they can be characterised as the failure of a marxism in theory and in governance to recognise and come to terms with the politics of identity in its most resilient form: ethnicity. While at a purely formal and legal level Stalin and his successors may have settled the 'nationalities question', it is absolutely clear that the profound ethnic substrata of these 'nations' remained untouched. In fact, they were untouchable by a doctrine whose fundamental category of identity and classification remains that of class.
These two aspects of the politics of identity are closely related. Your identity as a member of a family, for example, or as a citizen holding a passport, is not a purely abstract or legal matter. Both the family and citizenship are overlain and defined by layers of national-cultural affiliation. Ideas concerning behaviour, values, dispositions, and even size, mark out what is to be understood as a typically Australian, Vietnamese or Italian family. The manners and mores of family life are often the most difficult things that a student of languages has to learn. The legal identity offered by citizenship is usually related to ideas about national character reproduced in literature, histories and the print and electronic media. National identity and char acter retain a strong currency in Australia and the in evitable and very boring metaphors of the Bush and the Bushman will keep cropping up in movies and public debate.
So, the politics of identity is real, historical and integral to the development of modem nation-states. Where does this lead us? First to the recognition that the politics of identity has a long history which is dense, resilient and complex. Second, to the recognition that the politics of identity involves definite forms and mechanisms -politi cal, administrative, cultural, linguistic, historical -which enable identities to be formed, secured and reproduced. We need to say, in other words, that, yes, the personal is political in a very general sense but the job now is to differentiate the slogan and to 'un'-or de-fuse the two terms; and to ask more particular and discrete questions about how, why, in what terms and through which proces ses and mechanisms the personal gets linked to the politi cal.
A recent example from Eastern Europe might serve as a starting point. Ethnic Poles in the Ukraine are, on the whole, a very religious community. They share with many Ukrainians a profound historical adherence to the Churcn and they attend the same churches for worship. After the Mass has been celebrated, however, the Poles often stay behind in order to celebrate Mass again, this time in their own language and with their own ethnic or national icons. The performance of this ritual, the language in which it is performed and the icons deployed matter a great deal to ethnic Poles.
There are three factors here which are important in offering, securing and reproducing social identity. First, there is the role of the Church in providing religious prac tices which, while theoretically international, nonetheless provide a distinctive and tangible 'home' for proto-nation al and ethnic sentiments. The Catholic Church has histori cally been very good at the adaptation of distinctive regional ethnic and national icons and practices to its own liturgy.
Second, there is the fact that we are dealing here with a ives a who participate in it. The performance of the religious ritualnot so very far down the spectrum from attendance at political party meetings ana rallies -doubles here as a simultaneous affirmation of daily ethnic existence. You know, more or less, who will be at the meeting, that they will be performing gestures and saying things and offering respects to icons m the same way as you and in the same language. As Pascal once said, there is no need for a programmatic theory of religious belief: you kneel, you pray and there fore believe. In this case you perform these practices, recognise the icons, believe in God and participate in the general communion of Catholic Christendom but you know also that you are doing this at a particular time and place and simultaneously con firming an ethnicity or other sense of 'belonging'. Ritual practices are im portant in securing and reproducing social identity. and what is known by British linguists as Received Stand ard Pronunciation. This linguistic strategy has mattered a great deal in Australian political and cultural history since the late 1960s in the elaboration of a political culture and identity at a calculated distance from the 'Old Country'. It matters more intensely when, within the same state, you have divergent languages which are geographically con centrated, linked to social status and identified as a social and cultural bloc Another example from daily and routine existence: food and eating. Eating, including access to a viable market of appropriate commodities and forms of preparation is, like religious ritual and language, a social and cultural marker "That the personal is political is glaringly obvious but offers no ana classifier and, like language and ritual, can lead to dramatic forms of conflict. In Bradford, in the north of England, at the moment there is an uneasy political and cultural truce over eating. This is between the laige Mus lim community for whom the Halal method of animal slaughter and preparation is essential to the practice of their religion, and bodies like the RSPCA and animal welfare groups to whom this practice of slaughter is bar barous. In such a situation of an in tense politics of identity, one can im agine that the proposition that the personal is political won't get you very far since it is glaringly obvious but offers no answers.
Third, there is the matter of lan guage. This is a profound historical and cultural index of ethnicity and, for that matter, of any form of sub-cultural identity. The language of political meetings again springs to mind. Lan guage makes you a 'member' of a community, culture or sub-culture insofar as it gives you a visible and audible mark of adherence and affiliation. It is one of the most obvious ways along, perhaps, with dress, that marks you out as a 'foreigner and it has been one of the primary objects of legislation for governments which nave at tempted to deal with the 'national question' since the answers.
beginning of the nineteenth century. 'Unity of idiom is unity of the Revolution' said one of the key legislators of Revolutionary France in 1796. The fate of Gaelic in Scot land and Ireland, Welsh in Wales, Cornish in England, Breton and Proven^ale in France, and the hundreds of indigenous languages of Australia tell their own story in this regard. Language identifies, defines, includes and excludes more immediately and more dramatically than " r cultural practice. At a less dramatic but no pr less historical and resilient level, consider the role of Australian dialectical forms, the vocabulary, syntax, in tonation and general organisation of 'strine in its critical relationship to those forms of identity and affiliation of fered by the 'Queen's English'. After Menzies, no Australian prime minister could conceivably slip back into the bad old obsequious ways of fully rounded vowel tones Of course the personal is political, will say the local Labour Councillor who happens to be a devout Muslim. That is why my access to food prepared in accordance with Islamic doctrine is an issue, being fundamen tal to my personal lifestyle and religious preferences. Of course it is, will come the response from a mem ber of the same Labour Party branch who also belongs to Animal Libera tion and is committed to multiculturalism. That is why it is absolutely justifiable for me to resist these practices in order to protect Doth animals and my own deeply felt humane sentiments about their treatment and place in the order of things.
The arguments could be multiplied in relation to dress, gender, sexual orientation and preference, and so on. The politics of identity produces a multitude of new problems which are not resolved by the old solidarities, forms of allegiance and logics which characterise traditional politi cal organisations. But it is not worth being too triumphalist about this. The politics of identity is not, as some ad vocates of post-Fordism, postmodernism and 'New Times' seem to suggest, a liberated zone of daylight into which we are now emerging after the dark age of the blue-collar worker and the factory system. It has been around at least as long as them although obscured by a political choice which preferred one form of identity over others.
What the agenda of the politics of identity calls for is not the triumphant affirmation of a 'new reality7 because it is, after all, not so new. And there is no point either, in the hundred flowers' mode, of simply celebrating the emergence and proliferation of 'democratic identities'. Not all identities are democratic and there is no reason why we should expect them to be. Rather than romantic affirmation, what is needed is a way of posing the question of the relationship between democracy and identity, between the political and the personal, which takes into account the sorts of tensions and conflicts mentioned above over ethnidty, religion, lan guage, eating and those other multiple goods ana services, commodities and daily activities wnich define and shape the substance of people's daily lives.
These dimensions of the plurality and complexity of the personal/political relationship are not well-met, either, by the sort of political romantiasm with distinctively antigU( the democratic implications which, as Sheila Rowbotham arjes, was one of the outcomes of the 1970s argument that le personal is political. The theory was ...that by politidsing all aspects of life it would be possible to bring democratic relationships into Deing. Only when this split (of the per sonal/political) was overcome could political par ticipation be 'self-actualising' and integrate women as whole people.
In effect, she says, this fusion only served to construct new boundaries. One obvious negative outcome of this politidsation of everything and the failure to differentiate between the different levels and complexities of the personal/political relationship was a tendency which all on the Left, hopefully uncomfortably, will recog nise: to lay daim to a sententious jurisdiction over political and moral and ethical life as a whole. This was possible since everything was politi cal and the moral and the ethical were simply analogous and transparent domains.
The problem with this easy inter pretation is the degree of 'transparency' it assumes Detween, say, sexual relations of power and other forms of social power. There are, of course, connections but they are not always so easy to make and they are certainly not automat ic Things get in the way; things like external democratic mechanisms v e s t e d c :1" 1 1 iU! like nature ot the family These too are the components of a politics of identity but they have not been w ell-addressed by the 'psychologisation' of the personal/political relationship. The problem here has been the assumption that the real and experienced demarcation between the personal and the political, the private and the public is actually a 'split' which needs in some way to be needed, resolved or over come. This is a classic Romantic conception of the world. First, organise the world into those things that are assodated with unreason, feeling, imagination, spontaneity, "Identities and personalities are multiple. This is not a postmodernist credo or a problem"
But it is a pity, from the point of view of both pluralism and the recognition of democratic mechanisms, that the demarcation between personal and political, private and public, has to be thought of in this way. Why think of this demarcation as 'split'? It seems to me, on the contrary, that the relationship between the personal and the political or the domain of identity and the domain of government is not at all characterised by splits and divisions but rather by historically variable forms of alliance. Social identities are secured and reproduced by establishing a relationship between a specific sense of self and a range of institutions, everyday practices, commodities, objects and ritualsfamilies, schools, communities, workplaces, the market, meat, dothing, shopping, styles of eating, religious and quasi-religious rituals, leisure activities, political parties and so on -which we might call the 'material culture of everyday life'. This, after all, is what most people's ex perience of politics and the issues that matter is all about.
One of the consequences of this complex set of alliances is that people are not 'whole' or 'full' or 'actualised' iden tities, but a combination, to a greater or lesser extent, of a whole range of partial identities determined by their everyday prac tices, rituals, affiliations and relation ships to other people, objects and commodities. This indudes, obvious ly and importantly, a dass-relation ship and access to the purchase of objects and the uses of them in dis tinctive lifestyle patterns but this is only one powerful relationship among others. A politics of identity should, therefore,be about recognis ing and engaging with the wnole complex extent of this array of prac tices rather than either the realisation of the whole person or the incarcera tion of that person into a single affilia tion. 
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a certain traditional distribution of male and fe tributes under these headings and possible also to recog nise how a post-Freudian logic might lend credence to this idea of a split. This is no acddent. recognise emale atIdentities and personalities are multiple. This is not a postmodernist credo or a 'problem' which needs a Freudian cure. The multiple nature of sodal identity is a basic and operational prindple of modem forms of government, the aims of which have been, to put it simply, to orchestrate identities under an umbrella of national affiliation or dtizenship.
On II Pluvifise, Year II in the French revolutionary calen dar (January 31,1796), a man who might be said to have inaugurated the politics of identity in its most coherent form -the Abb6 Gr6goire -advised one of the Chambers of the French National Assembly that When one reconstructs a government anew, it is necessary to republicanise everything. The legis lator who ignores the importance of signs will fail at his mission; he should not let escape any oc casion for grabbing hold of the senses, for awakening republican ideas. Soon the soul is penetrated by the objects constantly in front of its eyes; and this combination, of facts, of emblems which retraces without cease for the dtizen his rights and his duties; this collection forms in a manner of speaking, the republican mold which gives him a national character and the demeanour of a free man.
This logic of government -one which establishes, as a condition of its existence, a social identity who is simul taneously national, free and republican -is not so arcane. It is a logic which is not very far from a recent experience in Australia. Think back a couple of years to the 1988 Bicen tencommunity and daily preferred images of a national landscape and the configura tions of a national character and you come up with a continu ing rather than a one-off Bicentennial and celebratory logic Bicentenaries and other, more regular, forms of spec tacular national celebration, rehearse, albeit in accelerated and condensed ways, a politicisation of the stuff of everyday life and demonstrate the persistence and impor tance of the relationship between the 'personal' and the 'political'. This is transacted and negotiated through the central category of the citizen which is contractually re lated both to the state and the apparatus of government and of the nation and the less formal cultural accretions of national identity, or, even more informally, that 'sense of belonging' and 'sense of place' which have such a central role in Australian political and cultural history.
Where do these senses and this texture of a distinctive everyday life get elaborated and consolidated? In institu tions like the family, the school, the workplace and the pub, ng, worshipping, rallying, watchin] the television and reaain
In practices like eating worshipping, newspapers and other forms oi literature. In forms of behaviour like dress, language and other forms of 'self-presentation'. In the print and electronic media, in icons and emblems and government documents and in forms of local, regional and national celebration. Everywhere, in fact This is the hard and compacted ground of a politics of K lU : JULY 1990 identity. It is compacted and therefore complex because it is the accumulated result of a long process of securing a resilient relationship between 'people', 'nation' and 'state'. The objective of this politics of identity would be the consolidation, progressively at arm's length and in increas ingly negotiated ways, of 'manageable' and preferred forms of social identity. The nation becomes, in this con text, a tim e (with a specific and identifiable and 'meaningful' history), a place (with demarcated borders but, more importantly, a distinctive sense of place, land and landscape) and, for want of a better term, a lifestyle (with distinctive ways of living, manners, customs and behaviours which are peculiar to this time and place, this nation and no other).
These forms of social identity have been amassed under the general category of citizenship. And what is crucial about this category and the ways in which it has developed -and which give it a significant potential in rethinking the contemporary politics of identity -is that it is not a purely legal-constitutional definition. To be effective in holding together multiple possible forms of identity, citizenship has depended crucially on its interconnections with a whole network of cultural identifications and points of reference.
These have been secured through popular education, through the development of the print and electronic media, through the histories, literatures and reports dealing with the preferred attributes of national character and other forms of training in 'personal', 'cultural' and 'dvic' at titudes. Citizenship is, in this sense, much more than having your name entered on a register of births or making an oath at a naturalisation ceremony. It involves entry into -and forms of affiliation with -a cultural network of institutions, identifications and practices from the British monarchy right down to the backyard barbie.
Which brings us to the rub. If the politics of identity and the politics of the personal are inextricably tied up with the politics of citizenship, what then?
Bertrand Russell once advised in a rather squeaky and imperious way that every democrat should have what he called 'a portion of the governmental mentality'. This point is well taken but we would need to tread carefully here to avoid another regime of sententious moralising which might rival the worst aspects of 'the personal is political' push and produce another Jacobin Terror of invigilation and condemnation. The question of citizenship is far better approached not simply from its dvic, constitutional or governmental dimensions but rather from the range of related identities which have accumulated around i t These are its more resilient and complex dimensions and they indude questions of ethnirity, of gender identification, of religious and political affiliation, of being a member of an indigenous or ethnic community. These forms of affiliation are often the fundamental medium which determine our relationship to government.
To say that the dtizen is a white bourgeois male with a single ethnic affiliation is probably overstating it a bit but not too much. The birth of the dtizen in the late eighteenth century was in the context of a certain relationship to property rights, a certain legal dassification of the in dividual, a certain definition of gender and a certain sense of a homogeneous national culture. Some countries, notab ly the UK, are busily reinventing these initial constraints in order to deal with problems like Hong Kong and local government finandng in the explidt name of the 'active dtizen'. This indicates some of the problems associated with the inherited concept of the dtizen, the fart that it is, for large sections of the population, through gender, ine quality of income and educational opportunity, only ever a partial dtizenship. But while signalling its limitations, these factors also indicate the potential of a politics of dtizenship when elaborated in terms of a more general politics or identity.
The politics of dtizenship means, in this context, a politics which would enable us to coherently address ques tions of social and economic justice, of access to the market defined not in purely economic terms but rather in terms of quality of life, of rights of access to and partidpation in sodal and natural environments and the custodianship or stewardship of them. The politics of dtizenship offers a strategic way of addressing those nitty-gritty components of lifestyle' -how people get dothed, fed and live -by recognising that these are simultaneously 'economic' ques tions of resource allocation and distribution and 'cultural' questions of identity and quality of life.
There are, of course, the legal and constitutional dimen sions of dtizenship which would enable this reworked politics of identity to be firmly rooted in due legal process and the governmental domain. This is important in order to prevent it from being romantidsed into the ether of personal or even group liberation.
The politics of identity, when thought of in terms of dtizenship, is not about the celebration of the 'exceptional' identities assoaated with race, ethnidty or gender. Rather, it is about enabling access to sodal justice in those institu tions and practices of everyday life like domestic organisa tion, work, schooling, the market, the environment and the community which is where identities get constructed and mobilised in the first place.
Citizenship is about rights, entitlements and duties and all of these have been given distinctive new profiles on the political agenda by feminism, anti-radsm, the environ mental movement and various campaigns on social justice and policy. It would be a pity to lose these profiles for want of a political logic which is able to address them together, strategically and coherently. Two hundred years after its first formulation the concept of dtizenship may, in the context of the porosity of national borders, the reality of multiculturalism and the new politics of identity, be ready for a transformed existence.
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